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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
I. INTRODUCTION
Western Surety finds itself in a difficult position. The Idaho Department of Transportation
("ITD") has for many years forwarded "claims" to it by consumers and auto dealers and ITD expects
Western Surety to handle and resolve these claims. The vast majority of these claims are not based
on judgments. Western Surety has paid many claims in Idaho over the years that were not based on
judgments.

Were Western Surety simply to adopt Hestead's view of how it should handle

undisputed claims on motor vehicle dealer bonds, and begin refusing to process claims not based on
judgments, Western Surety would assuredly be inviting conflict with the auto dealers and others
whose undisputed claims Western Surety has paid in the past. Western Surety would likely face
claims of bad faith for refusing to pay undisputed claims.
Hestead argues that Western Surety has been paying motor vehicle dealer bond claims
illegally, and that what Western Surety should have done over the years was to tell claimants - even
those with claims the principal did not dispute - that Western Surety can only pay claims based on
judgments, and that those with undisputed claims have to go to the expense of hiring lawyers to
litigate to judgment these undisputed claims.
Hestead's proposed interpretation ofl.C. §§ 49-1610 and 41-1839(3), which would result in
a rule that requires sureties such as Western Surety to deny undisputed claims and force claimants
and principals into litigation to prove what no one disputes, is absurd. The purpose of l.C. § 411839(3) is to encourage sureties to pay claims and avoid litigation; the purpose of I.C. § 49-1610 is
to protect principals; and the purpose of the motor vehicle dealer bond requirement is to protect
-l-

consumers and others harmed by violations ofldaho's motor vehicle dealer statutes. Western Surety
accomplished all of these goals by paying the undisputed claims of the Dealers and Brasher's
claimants before Hestead submitted his claim.
Hestead's proposed interpretation ofl.C. §§ 49-1610 and 41-1839(3) does not harmonize the
statutes. It sets them against each other, as the purpose ofl.C. § 41-1839(3) is to discourage sureties
from forcing claimants into litigation, and Hestead' s interpretation of LC. § 49-1610 would require
that a clamant always resort to litigation, and obtain a judgment, before submitting a claim to a
surety.
Idaho Code § 49-1610 plainly exists to provide procedural protections to bond principals
(typically motor vehicle dealers) that wish to dispute a claim. This Court cannot construe that statute
to protect claimants, such as Hestead, because it requires them (when a principal disputes a claim)
to resort to litigation and obtain a judgment to prove a disputed claim against the principal. If a
principal, however, does not wish to dispute a claim, as happened in this case with respect to the
claims paid before Hestead filed his, it is absurd to interpret the statute in a way that forces the
principal (and claimant) into litigation nevertheless.

This is precisely the interpretation Hestead

urges upon this Court, however.
This Court should not interpret the statutes to require Western Surety (and other sureties) to
force claimants and principals into litigation to prove what no one disputes. That would make a
mockery of this Court's bad faith jurisprudence, which encourages insurers and sureties to timely
pay valid claims and avoid litigation, as well as undermine the plain meaning ofl.C. § 41-1839(3).
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Western Surety paid the claims submitted before Hestead's in good faith and exhausted the
bond. Hestead does not appeal the district court's finding that the claims were paid in good faith in
the full amount of the bond. He also has not cited to the Court any statutory or other legal authority
indicating that a surety may be held liable above the statutory bond amount for what he contends was
a failure to follow the procedures ofldaho Code§ 49-1610. Western Surety should not be punished
for paying claims in good faith.
Therefore, Western Surety respectfully requests that this Court find that the district court
erred in granting Hestead summary judgment as a matter of law. Western Surety requests that this
Court vacate the district court's judgment, and remand to the district court with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Western Surety. Western Surety also requests attorney fees and costs on
appeal.

II. ARGUMENT

A.

Idaho Code § 49-1610 Does Not Require That a Surety Pay Claims Only Upon
Presentation of a Judgment, Unlike the Statutes of Other States.
Hestead asserts that "Western Surety has been writing automobile surety bonds for at least

10 years in Idaho and is fully aware of the requirements of Idaho Code 49-1610." 1

1

Hestead refers to a February 18, 2000, letter written by Michael Dow of Western Surety that indicates a
claimant may recover under the bond pursuant to J.C. § 49-16 IO. (R. Vol. I, pp. 32-33.) As a preliminary matter,
only this Court has the power to interpret the law. An eleven (11) year old letter by a Western Surety employee is
not precedent or authoritative in any way. Even assuming the letter said what Hestead contends (and it does not), it
makes as much sense for Hestead to rely on the letter as authority as it does for Western Surety. It is not authority.
That being said, the letter does not say what Hestead contends. First, the letter did not state that a claimant must
obtain a judgment to make a claim. That letter began by stating that Western Surety would write to the principal to
obtain a statement of the principal's position and then requested that the claimant provide all evidence to establish a
breach of the bond conditions by the principal. (Id., p. 32.) The letter provided the language of I.C. § 49-1610 and
asked that the claimant inform Western Surety ifhe chose to proceed under the statute to make the claim. (d., pp.
32-33 .) The letter does not state that the claimant was required to obtain a judgment to make a claim. (fd.) This
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(Respondents/Cross Appellants Brief ("Respondent's Brief'), p. 3.) Western Surety agrees that it
is aware of LC. § 49-1610 and that it understands the statute to provide a procedure by which a
claimant may proceed when a claim is disputed by a principal. However, Western Surety does not
agree with Hestead' s proposition that LC. § 49-1610 requires a surety to tum away all claims not
based on judgments, and that a surety that pays a claim not based on a judgment is exposed to
liability in excess of the statutorily set aggregate liability of $20,000.00.
The purpose of LC. § 49-1610 is to indemnify people "injured by [a] dealer's fraud in
conducting his business of selling vehicles." Bryant Motors, Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Cos., 118 Idaho
796, 799, 800 P.2d 683,686 (Ct. App. 1990). There is no dispute that Western Surety accomplished
this purpose when it paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims. There is no support for Hestead's
argument that LC.§ 49-1610 requires slavish compliance with its alleged procedural requirements
at the expense of paying undisputed claims.
Idaho Code § 49-1608 describes the purpose for which the bond is required and the
obligation secured when it states that a dealer "shall not practice any fraud, make any fraudulent
representation or violate any of the provisions of this chapter, rules of the department, or the
provisions of chapter 5, title 49, section 49-1418, or chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code .... " LC. § 491608(1). Idaho Code§ 49-1610(1) provides similarly. Thus, the purpose in which the bond is to be
construed is protection of the consumer from a dealer's illegal activities.

letter is very similar to the letters provided to the auto auctions in this case, and is consistent with the position taken
by Western Surety in regard to Hestead's claim. (R. Vol. II, pp. 135-36, 144-45, 175.)
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However, implicit iri Hestead's argument is the position that the procedural elements ofI.C.
§ 49-1610( 4) exist to protect him. They do not. The procedural steps of I.C. § 49-1610 can only be
intended to provide protection to a principal that wishes to dispute a claim. The procedural steps
cannot be interpreted to protect a claimant, as they make it more difficult for a claimant to pursue
a claim. 2
The plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the statutory language demonstrates that the
legislature intended to protect a dealer who disputes that a violation occurred by giving persons who
suffer loss or damage a right of action against such dealer. The process does not benefit a claimant
who has to follow the procedures and pay the fees and costs associated with filing and litigating suit.
The procedures benefit the principal and make sense only if the principal disputes the claim.
Hestead argues that Western Surety's interpretation of I.C. § 49-1610 would write the
procedure out of the Idaho Code. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 13.) Resorting to a hyperbole, Hestead
argues that the statute becomes "mere surplusage if a surety can pay any claim that comes into its
offices without regard as to whether there is a judgment." (Id.) However, Western Surety is not
arguing that it can "pay any claim." Obviously, Western Surety can only pay claims for violations
of the Idaho Code, as specified by I.C. § 49-1608, consistent with the one Idaho statute (I.C. § 411839(3)) that tells how a surety must handle a claim, which is in "good faith."
Hestead cites to statutes from Missouri, Colorado, Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, and Montana
to argue that "many states require a judgment." But the statutes of those states all contain language

2

Procedural protections exist to protect defendants, such as a principal or a motor vehicle dealer, not

claimants.
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different from LC. § 49-1610. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 15-18.) In the minority of states that do
require a judgment before a person may file a claim on a motor vehicle dealer bond, the language in
the statutes provides unambiguous language requiring a judgment. For example, Montana Code §
61-4-126(1) states:
(1) A person who suffers loss or damage because of the unlawful
conduct of a dealer, broker, wholesaler, or auto auction licensed under
this title shall obtain a judgment from a court of competent
jurisdiction prior to collecting on the bond of the dealer, broker,
wholesaler, or auto auction. The judgment must set out a specific loss
or damage amount and establish that the licensee's unlawful conduct
caused the loss or damage, before payment on the bond is required.
Mont. Code Ann. § 61-4-126(1) (emphasis added). This statutory language specifically makes the
obtaining of a judgment a prerequisite for filing a claim on a bond, as opposed to LC.§ 49-1610(4),
which states a "judgment creditor may file a verified claim." See Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848,
908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) ("When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the
imperative or mandatory meaning of 'must' or 'shall."')
Michigan Compiled Laws § 257.248(2) contains language more akin to the rule Hestead
proposes: "The surety shall make indemnification or reimbursement for a monetary loss only cifter

judgment based on fraud, cheating, or misrepresentation has been entered in a court ofrecord against
the licensee." Mich. Comp. Laws§ 257.248(2) (emphasis added). This statute not only requires that
a judgment be obtained, but it is also phrased in terms oflimiting the surety's right to make payment,
unlike I.C. § 49-1610. The statutes of Missouri and Colorado also use language defining the surety's
rights and obligations. See Rs. Mo.§ 301.560(3) (''The proceeds of the bond or irrevocable letter of
credit shall be paid upon receipt by the department of a final judgment from a Missouri court of
-6-

competent jurisdiction against the principal and in favor of an aggrieved party."); Colo. Rev. Stat. §
12-6-l l 1(2)(b) ("No corporate surety shall be required to make any payment to any person claiming
under such bond until a final determination of fraud or fraudulent representation has been made by
the board or by a court of competent jurisdiction.").
Hestead admits that the other statutes he references contain more restrictive procedures.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 16.) Therefore, these statutes and procedures from other jurisdictions are not
pertinent in determining the issues in this cases nor is there any indication that any of these courts
considered the interplay between a motor vehicle dealer bond statute and a statute such as I.C. § 411839(3), which specifically defines a surety's duties with respect to handling and payment of a claim.
B.

Reading I.C. §§ 49-1610 and 41-1839 Together Leads to the Conclusion that a Surety
May Make Payments Under A Motor Vehicle Dealer Bond on Claims Not Based on
Judgments.

Idaho Code §§ 49-1610 and 41-1839 must be read together because they are in pari materia.

See Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006). As this Court stated
recently in Rogers v. Household Life Insurance Co., the entire statutory framework must be
considered with statutes that are in pari materia. 150 Idaho 735, _, 250 P.3d 786, 788 (2011).
Idaho Code § 49-1610, according to Hestead, requires litigation, while the purpose of LC. §
41-1839 is clearly to avoid litigation. There is no way to harmonize the statutes by requiring sureties
to refuse to handle claims that are not based on judgments, even when all parties - the claimant, the
principal, and the surety - agree a claim is valid and should be paid.
Reading I.C. § 49-1610 to require a surety to only pay when a judgment is presented - even
when a claim is undisputed - does not serve either the creditor, the dealer, or the bond company, as
-7-

asserted by Hestead. (See Respondent's Brief, p. 14.) Hestead's interpretation would undennine I.C.
§§ 49-1610 and 41-1839(3) by requiring sureties to force claimants and principals into costly

litigation over undisputed claims, which I.C. § 41-1839(3) forbids. The process in§ 49-1610 exists
for the benefit of the principal and, if a principal does not want to dispute the claim, it would be
absurd to interpret the statute in a way that forces litigation upon a principal and claimant who do not
want to litigate.
Hestead wishes to avoid application of I.C. § 41-1839(3) by arguing that the word "claim" in
that subsection refers only to those based on judgments. (Respondent's Brief, p. 19.) However, I.C.
§ 41-1839(3) provides that "[t]he surety shall be authorized to determine what portion or amount of

such claim is justly due the creditor or claimant and payment or tender of the amount so detennined
by the surety shall not be deemed a volunteer payment. ... " (Emphasis added.) Thus, I.C. § 411839(3) requires a surety to handle claims of "claimants" or "creditors," i.e., the statute requires
sureties to handle claims based on judgments and claims not based on judgments.
The rule Hestead proposes is that sureties cannot pay undisputed claims not based on
judgments. Were a company like Western Surety to refuse to pay undisputed claims under the
statutory scheme it would face an attorney fee award pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839(3) for not paying an
amount justly due under the bond, and also potentially face a bad faith claim. Idaho Code § 41-183 9
provides incentive for insurers and sureties to settle claims to reduce litigation and its associated
costs. 1\;fartin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,247, 61 P.3d 601,604 (2002). The
point of the statute, as well as this Court's bad faith jurisprudence, is that insurers and sureties should
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not unreasonably deny or delay payment of claims. That is exactly what Hestead's proposed rule
could encourage.
1.

Western Surety's payment of the Dealers and Brasher's claims complied with
I.C. § 41-1839(3) and this Court's bad faith jurisprudence.

The answer to virtually every criticism leveled by Hestead is J.C. § 41-1839(3) and this
Court's bad faith jurisprudence. The intent of the Idaho legislature in passing LC.§ 41-1839(3)
plainly was to codify a bias in favor of payment by sureties of claims. The statute does not say every
procedure must be followed to the letter, or that payment by a surety of a doubtful or even invalid
claim entitles anyone, e.g., a principal or third party claimant, to argue that payment was invalid.
The sole criteria a surety must meet in paying claims is to pay in "good faith." If it does that
it is not a volunteer and can pursue the principal for indemnification. For the sake of argument, even
if all of Hestead's arguments are correct, he still must lose because the district court found Western
Surety paid the Dealers and Brasher's claims in good faith.
Western Surety's interactions with ITD is a crucial part of the good faith analysis. ITD
expects sureties to pay claims that are forwarded to them. Over the last five years, ITD has forwarded
between 60 and 80 "consumer complaints," referred to as "claims" by ITD, to sureties for processing,
as opposed to approximately 3 or 4 actual judgments. (Affidavit of Joshua S. Evett in Supp. of Def. 's
Opp'n to Pl. 's Mot. for Summ. J. ("Evett Aff."), Deposition of Daryl Marler ("Marler Dep."), p. 41,
1. 13 - p. 42, 1. 3, R. Vol. I, p. 84.) Daryl Marler, Dealer Operations Supervisor at ITD, testified that
ITD expects sureties to respond to the claims it forwards them. (Id., p. 38, 11. 17-23, R. Vol. I, p. 83.)
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Western Surety informs ITDof any settlements it has made, as requested by ITD, and ITD has
never told Western Surety that its process for paying claims is improper, inadequate, or in violation
of the law. (Snyder Aff., ,-r,r 6.i - 6.j, R. Vol. II, p. 118.)
The record establishes that Western Surety - even if the Court finds a technical, procedural
statutory violation - paid the Dealers and Brasher' s claims with the best of intentions in an effort to
resolve valid, legitimate claims. Because the claims were paid in good faith, Hestead cannot
challenge them.
2.

Hestead cannot challenge whether the payments to Dealers and Brasher's were in good
faith.
Hestead now attempts to argue in a footnote that Western Surety did not act in good faith in

paying the claims presented by Dealers and Brasher's. (Respondent's Brief, p. 23, fn. 1.) He also
makes statements such as"[a]pparently Brashsers [sic] had extended some kind of credit to this entity
from April to September" and "Nick Hestead seriously questions whether the auctions had the right
to withhold titles because the auctions knew Best of the Best would sell the vehicles to bona fide
purchasers for value."3 (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 5-7.) Hestead has provided no basis in the
record for these assertions. See Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, _, 244 P.3d 197, 202 (2010)
("Conclusory allegations and assertions of fact contained in the brief without citation to the record
below are not sufficient to support an argument on appeal.")

3

Hestead does not dispute that the purchasers of the vehicles were bona fide purchasers. (Respondent's
Brief, p. 6.)
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Hestead then again cites to a letter only in part when he states that the Dealers demand was
based on the intent to defraud due to payment of insufficient funds by way of check. (Id., p. 6.) The
October 10, 2008, letter from Dealers to Western Surety states that not only did Best of the Best
obtain vehicles from Dealers with an intent to defraud, but the dealership also "violated multiple
Idaho Code Sections, including but not limited to J.C. § 49-1609A and§ 49-1613 by knowingly
transferring vehicles without satisfying its obligations to Dealers." (R. Vol. II, p. 133 .) Western
Surety also established in district court that Best of the Best violated J.C.§§ 49-1608(1) and 491610(1) by failing to provide consumers who bought cars from Best of the Best with their titles.
Hestead did not challenge Western Surety's contentions below that the payments were made

in good faith. Nor did Hestead challenge the district court's finding that the payments were made in
good faith as an issue on appeal. See Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 151 Idaho 266,
, 255 P.3d 1152, 1164 (2011). Therefore, Hestead's arguments must fail.
C.

When a Surety Makes a Payment in Good Faith it May Seek Indemnity From Its
Principal Pursuant to J.C. § 41-1839(3), Not a Claimant.

In an effort to convince this Court to find that Western Surety has a remedy against the
Dealers and Brasher' s claimants, Hestead asserts that Western Surety can recover its payments from
the auto auctions pursuant to LC. § 41-1839(3). (Respondents Brief, p. 21.) While Western Surety
has a valid right of indemnity because it made the payments to Dealers and Brasher' s in good faith,
the right of indemnity applies against Best of the Best, not the auto auctions. Idaho Code § 411839(3) applies to surety contracts issued by an insurer as to a principal and thus the right of
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indemnification and/or subrogation discussed refers to that surety/principal relationship. It does not
contemplate recoveries against the creditor or claimant.
Hestead appears to support his argument regarding Westerns Surety's right to indemnification
with two Idaho cases that he contends define what constitutes a "volunteer" payment. (Respondent's
Brief, p. 21.) However, both Quintana v. Quintana, 119 Idaho 1, 803 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1990), and

Shea v. Owyhee County, 66 Idaho 159, 156 P.2d 331 (1945), involved different statutory obligations
than are at play here. Quintana involved the responsibility for the payment of taxes pursuant to LC.
§ 15-3-916. 66 Idaho 159, 156 P.2d 331. Shea v. Owyhee County, involved the payment by a

purchaser under a contract of sale of lands for delinquent and subsequent taxes, and analyzed I. C. §§
30-708 and 61-1902. 66 Idaho 159, 156 P.2d 331.
Idaho Code § 41-183 9(3) specifically defines what constitutes volunteer payments, stating that
so long as the payment is made in good faith, it will not be deemed a volunteer payment. LC. § 411839(3 ). Therefore, the payments made by Western Surety were not volunteer payments, as Hestead
claimed below.

D.

Western Surety is Not Required to Use the Interpleader Remedy.
Hestead argues that legitimate claimants may be left out of the payment process and, therefore,

Western Surety should use the interpleader remedy. (Respondent's Brief, p. 24.) Whether LC.§ 491610 requires a judgment or not, it certainly does not require a surety to follow the interpleader
process.
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In addition, interpleader was not appropriate here. 4 Two claims were presented by Dealers
and Brasher's. Western Surety was able to reach settlement agreements within the amount of the
bond, so interpleader was not necessary. Hestead did not send his complaint to ITD until after the
two claims had been paid. Therefore, Hestead's argument for interpleader is irrelevant in addition
to having nothing to do with the issues presented on appeal.

Western Surety is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

E.

The district court denied Hestead's request for attorney fees "as he did not seek recovery of
fees under Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) and (3)."

(R. Vol. II, p. 284; R. Vol. II, pp. 258-59.)

Additionally, Hestead specifically argued in his Memorandum in Response to Defendants Objection
to Costs and Attorneys Fees that I.C. § 41-1839 does not apply to the award of attorney fees in this
case as Hestead is not an "insured" under the bond. (R. Vol. II, pp. 271-72.) On appeal, he now
apparently seeks to argue that I.C. § 41-1839 does apply to the award of attorney fees but he does not
provide a basis for such an award.
Western Surety again requests fees pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839(1) and (4) on the basis that
Hestead's claim was brought and pursued without foundation in law because the plain language of
I.C. § 41-1839(3) requires a surety to pay valid, undisputed claims submitted to it without requiring

4

Hestead cites to an April 19, 20 I 0, letter from claims manager Thomas Snyder in support of his argument
that interpleader is appropriate. (Respondent's Brief, p. 25.) Once again, a letter from a Western Surety
representative has no legal authority or significance. Additionally, the entirety of the statement by Mr. Snyder read:
"An interpleader action does get filed in cases were there is more than one claim at the same time and the total
amount of those claims is in excess of the penal sum. Since there are not competing claims and there is no money
available under the bond, there is no need for an interpleader action." (R. Vol. II, p. 187).
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that the claimant first obtain a judgment and J.C. § 49-1610 does not negate that obligation.
Accordingly, Western Surety is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
Western Surety respectfully requests that this Court find that the district court erred in granting
Hestead summary judgment as a matter of law. Western Surety acted in accordance with J.C.§ 49160 and 41-1839 when it exhausted the $20,000.00 motor vehicle dealer bond through payments on
valid, undisputed claims. Therefore, Western Surety requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment, and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Western
Surety. Western Surety also requests attorney fees and costs on appeal.

CROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hestead did not provide a Statement of the Case in relation to his cross-appeal; therefore,
Western Surety has no facts to rebut.
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Western Surety, as Cross-Respondent, Is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to LC.
§ 41-1839.
Ill. ARGUMENT

A.

1-Iestead Is Not Entitled to Sales Tax and Loan Interest Damage Because Such Damages
Are Not Contemplated By LC.§ 49-1610.
Idaho Code§ 49-1610( 4) provides that a person may submit a claim to the surety ''.for any loss

or damage .... " The statute does not provide for interest, sales ta"'\, attorney fees and costs. Hestead
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relies on Spreader Specialists, Inc. v. Monroe, Inc., 114 Idaho 15, 752 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1987), in
support of his contention that loan interest may be considered in calculating damages. (Respondent's
Brief, p. 28.) However, the Court of Appeals in Monroe held "that interest charges incurred on a loan
obtained in good faith, as part ofa reasonable course ofaction to mitigate losses, may be recovered
as an item of consequential damages." 114 Idaho at 22, 752 P.2d at 624 ( emphasis added). That is
not the situation here. The interest and sales tax paid on Hestead's loan for his vehicle, which he is
still driving, are not the "loss or damages" contemplated by I.C. § 49-1610, as found by the district
court here. Therefore, even assuming Hestead was entitled to relief, the district court correctly found
that his only entitlement was to damages of $12,500.00.

B.

Western Surety is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Hestead's request for attorney fees was denied by the district court because he did not seek

recovery of fees under I.C. § 41-1839(1) and (3). (R. Vol. II, p. 284; R. Vol. JI, pp. 258-59.)
Additionally, Hestead specifically argued in his Memorandum in Response to Defendants Objection
to Costs and Attorneys Fees that I. C. § 41-1839 does not apply to the award of attorney fees in this
case as Hestead is not an "insured" under the bond. (R. Vol. II, pp. 271-72.) On appeal, he now
apparently seeks to argue that I. C. § 41-183 9 does apply to the award of attorney fees but he does not
provide a basis for such an award.
Western Surety again requests fees pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839(1) and (4) on the basis that
fiestead's claim was brought and pursued without foundation in law because the plain language of
LC. § 49-1610 does not include interest and sales tax as an element of damages. Accordingly,
Western Surety is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Should this Court determine that Hestead prevails on Western Surety's appeal, Western Surety
respectfully requests that this Court deny Hestead's cross-appeal as he is not entitled to damages
above the amount determined to be appropriate by the district court. Western Surety also requests
attorney fees and costs.
DATED this

23---- day of August, 2011.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By~*
~

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
CNA Surety, dba Western Surety Company
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John L. Gannon
Attorney at Law
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